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 The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) was created in 2002 as a 
component of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Previously self-regulated, auditors of publicly 
traded companies are now subject to oversight from an outside and independent organization. 
One primary mission of the PCAOB is to ensure the informational integrity and transparency of 
the auditor’s report to benefit all relevant stakeholders (PCAOB 2014b). The Board is always 
looking for new ways to enhance the content of the report, and make it more useful for 
individuals. After months of substantial research and tests, the Board may choose to release a 
new proposal for an amendment to the report. Two proposed auditing standards were recently 
released by PCAOB to increase the information content of the audit reports. First, Release no. 
2013-009 would require the name of the engagement partner to be disclosed in the audit report. 
In addition, the names, locations, and extent of participation of other accounting firms in the 
audit would also be disclosed (PCAOB 2013b).  This is intended to increase the transparency of 
the audit process to financial statement users. Next, Release no. 2013-005 proposes that the 
auditor to communicate Critical Audit Matters (CAMS) in the audit report.  The CAMs are areas 
of the financial statements which are subject to a higher risk of material misstatement (PCAOB 
2013a).  Overall, the proposals aim to improve the transparency and extent of information in 
public company audits while maintaining the mission of the PCAOB. 
 While both proposals still need final approval by both the PCAOB and the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), the previously mentioned changes would be the most significant 
to audit reporting in the last 40 to 50 years. The US auditor’s report featured very little change 
since the 1940s, and many stakeholders believe that it does not provide enough information that 
is specific to a particular audit.  Therefore, PCAOB strives to increase the information content of 
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the report through the proposed auditing standards. This thesis will describe the existing audit 
report, the details of each proposal, and analyze and evaluate the comment letters related to the 
proposals that the PCAOB received from various financial reporting stakeholders (PCAOB 
2013a). The results of my comment letter analysis suggest that the signature requirement would 
not increase audit quality, but may increase individual liability for the audit partner. The results 
also suggest that the inclusion of CAMs and other information would create confusion for users 
of the audit report, and may be costly to implement through increases in audit work and time. 
From this, one will be able to better understand what is included in the current audit report, and 
how the proposed auditing standards may impact the information content on a prospective basis. 
 
II. The Audit Report & Related Documentation 
 
 The standard audit report is the end means of documenting and communicating the 
auditor’s work in evaluation management’s financial statements, and the communication of a 
report is expressly included in the Generally Accepted Auditing Standards (PCAOB 2013a). In 
the United States, the auditor’s report has changed very little since the 1940s. The current 
pass/fail model being used is believed to be useful because of its clear and concise assessment of 
the fair presentation of the financial statements (PCAOB 2013a). In the early 1900s, auditors 
wrote free-form audit reports for each client, because no auditing standards existed at that time 
(PCAOB 2011). By the 1920s, the audit report was reduced to one paragraph and served as a 
certification by the auditor that the balance sheet was accurate. Understanding that the auditor’s 
report was an opinion and not a guarantee, report wording was changed in 1934 to remove the 
term ‘certify.’ The audit report would be left unchanged until the 1980s, until pressures from 
congressional hearings and recommendations from the National Commission on Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting caused the formal addition of the scope paragraph (PCAOB 2011).  
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 Today’s traditional audit report consists of three key paragraphs: introductory, scope, and 
final opinion. The introductory paragraph highlights the financial statements and documents that 
have been audited and are part of the auditor’s opinion. This paragraph also specifically outlines 
the responsibilities of management and the auditor during the engagement. For example, the 
preparation of the financial statements is the responsibility of the Company’s management. The 
scope paragraph explains the nature of the audit, including basic methods used. It is important 
for the auditor to communicate that the audit can only provide reasonable assurance of 
conformity with GAAP and risk of material misstatement. The auditor will also outline the 
accounting principles used, and any estimates made by management within the financial 
statements. Lastly, the opinion paragraph details the auditor’s final opinion based on all of the 
evidence obtained during the audit. The auditor will complete the report with a manual or printed 
signature of the name of the audit firm (AU Section 508). 
 In addition to the audit report, auditors are required to keep work papers that serve as a 
written record for the basis of their conclusions. Examples of such documentation include 
confirmations, schedules, letters of representation, and general correspondence. The auditor must 
document procedures performed, all gathered evidence, and conclusions as they pertain to 
relevant financial statement assertions. This documentation must contain sufficient detail to 
clearly demonstrate its purpose, source, and conclusions reached. It also must be detailed enough 
in order to enable an experienced auditor, with no prior connection to the engagement, the ability 
to fully understand the work that was done during the audit (PCAOB 2004).  
  It was not until recently that the content and informational value of the report has come 
under public scrutiny. Recent research about the sufficiency of the audit report has yielded mixed 
results. A survey by Asare and Wright (2009) of investors, auditors, and lenders found that the 
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audit report is seen as useful to these decision makers. A report issued by the Center for Audit 
Quality (CAQ 2011) indicate that the unqualified audit report serves as a starting point for 
investors to make their decisions, and that the primary role of the auditor should not change. On 
the contrary, a focus-group study conducted by Gray et al. (2011) questions the sufficiency on 
the current audit report. Participants of this focus group included financial statement preparers, 
users, and external auditors. Results show that users have difficulty understanding key concepts 
in the audit report such as materiality and reasonable assurance. In addition, many participants 
voiced that they only look to see if the auditor’s opinion is unqualified, and do not actually read 
the report in full. A CFA Institute (2010) survey has also identified that stakeholders want more 
information in the audit report from the auditor. The survey results, communicated by Mock et 
al. (2011) show the following: 
 94% of participants want more information in the audit report 
 60% believe the report must contain more information about the audit process 
 72% want more information about the auditor’s independence; and 
 66% desire information about actual levels of assurance achieved in the audits  
 
It is clear that investors and financial statement users want more audit specific information, 
as well as a report that is more transparent, in order to potentially make better investment 
decisions. This scrutiny has served as a catalyst for the proposed audit reporting changes being 
considered today. The PCAOB recognizes the perceived need for additional information about 
the audit process specific to each company, and the Board proposed two potential audit 
standards. The first could require the personal signature of the engagement partner on the audit 
report. The second could require the disclosure of CAMs and other information specific to each 
audit. I will discuss the details of each proposal in turn. 
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III. PCAOB Release No. 2013-009: Improving Transparency Through Disclosure of 
Engagement Partner and Certain Other Participants in Audits 
 
 In an effort to increase the transparency of public company audits, the PCAOB proposed 
this amendment that would require the disclosure in the auditor’s report (1) the name of the 
engagement partner and (2) the names, locations, and extent of participation of other independent 
public accounting firms that took part in the audit. The Board’s mission to provide “informative, 
accurate, and independent audit reports” would be further accomplished through the above 
disclosures (PCAOB 2013b). Investors and financial statement users should have access to as 
much meaningful information as possible about a public company so that they may make 
informed decisions about the company’s financial strength and about the integrity of the 
company’s management. 
 As it currently stands in the United States, only the name of the firm that issued the 
opinion is disclosed in the auditor’s report. Although the US is not the only country that follows 
this lack of transparency, several other well-established jurisdictions follow a much different 
practice. Members of the European Union (EU), Taiwan, and Australia all require the disclosure 
of the names of the auditors conducting the audit, the engagement partner on the audit, or both. 
In addition, the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) has also 
proposed a new requirement for audit firms to disclose the name of the engagement partner 
(PCAOB 2013b). If the proposal is adopted, all jurisdictions that follow IAASB standards will 
begin following this level of disclosure. It is just another indication that there is a global trend 
toward greater transparency about public company audits, as well as who is conducting them. 
 The PCAOB has always been pressured by investors to provide more information about 
the independent audit, particularly information about the auditors involved. It is believed that 
disclosure of the engagement partner’s name would prompt them to perform their duties more 
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carefully, and with a greater sense of accountability to the various end users of the auditor’s 
report. It is not yet known what effect this proposal would have on audit fees or audit 
competition. The focus, however, would be to see an increase in audit quality as a result of a 
mandatory signing. It is important to note that the EU’s policy of mandatory partner-level 
signatures is not expected to increase individual liability for the audit partner (Blay et al. 2012). 
The audit partner’s name is already publicly available in the case of an audit failure (Mock et al. 
2013). For this reason, reputation is the most likely reason for an increase in audit quality (Blay 
et al. 2012). Blay et al. (2012) attempts to gain greater understanding into audit quality effects of 
the EU’s policy of mandatory partner-level signatures. It was difficult to create a powerful test to 
analyze effects of mandatory adoption of an engagement partner signature requirement. All EU 
member states adopted the policy at the same time, with no early or late control groups, making 
comparisons unreliable. Through multi-year analysis of audit quality in the Netherlands and 
United Kingdom, they were unable to find evidence to support the argument of improved audit 
quality when there is a requirement to disclose the engagement partner’s name. Abnormal 
accruals, magnitude of accruals relative to cash flows, and earnings benchmark tests were used 
as proxies to test the audit quality effects (Blay et al. 2012). The two countries adopted partner-
level signatures at different times, which allowed for comparison between a range of years when 
one country had already adopted the policy and the other had yet to require an audit partner 
signature.  
 The Board has been discussing the idea of disclosure requirements since 2005, when it 
started to consider ways to make the auditor’s report more informative. It was not until July 28, 
2009 that the PCAOB issued the concept release on the matter. Initially, many investors 
supported the requirement, while many other commenters expressed their concerns. Those 
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opposed of the disclosure requirement believed it would result in an increase in the engagement 
partner’s liability by making them the focus, and not the accounting firm as a whole. After over 2 
years of experience and commenters’ views, the Board issued the first proposing release on 
October 11, 2011, which proposed official amendment to the auditing standards that would 
require disclosure of the engagement partner’s name in the auditor’s report (PCAOB 2013b). 
Those that commented on this release were split. As was expected, accounting firms generally 
opposed the requirement to disclose the name of the engagement partner, while investors and 
some corporate officials argued in favor of the proposal.  
 On December 4, 2013 the PCAOB released proposal no. 2013-009 as the latest attempt to 
make disclosure amendments. The first part of this new proposal would require the disclosure of 
the name of the engagement partner for the most recent period’s audit. Although this may not 
provide much useful information in the short term, a history of information about a specific 
partner will be developed over time. This, when connected with other information, could help 
investors and other financial statement users make better overall investment decisions. Public 
disclosure of the current engagement partner is just an initial first step in the development of 
information sources such as engagement, litigation, and education history (PCAOB 2013b). 
 The second component of release no. 2013-009 would require the disclosure of certain 
other participants in the audit. This information would either be included in a paragraph 
following the auditor’s opinion, or in an appendix following the auditor’s report. The 
information about other participants would include (PCAOB 2013b) : 
 the name of the firm(s)/person(s) 
 the country of headquarters, or primary country of residence (if single person) 
 the percentage of work hours attributable to the audit performed by the other participants 
 
The proposal would not require the disclosure of the following participants: 
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 individuals employed by the company to provide direct assistance to the auditor (internal 
auditors or other company personnel) 
 individuals performing the engagement quality review (EQR) 
 
As businesses become increasingly globalized, it is important to understand that many 
international companies are audited by PCAOB-registered public accounting firms (especially 
the ‘Big Four’). In these cases, it is likely that other firms from all over the world participated in 
the audits of these companies. As a measure of cost-effectiveness, the US-based accounting firm 
will sometimes allow the other participants to do a substantial amount of the total audit work, but 
will then sign their firm’s name on the bottom of the auditor report (PCAOB 2013b). Regardless 
of the degree at which other firms participated in the audit, this places all responsibility on the 
signing firm. Knowing the names, locations, and degree of participation of others in the audit 
would give users of the audit report the ability to research additional information about the 
participants. This falls directly in line with the PCAOB’s mission to make the audit report more 
transparent and contain more useful information for those that use it (PCAOB 2013b). 
 An immediate concern of this proposed amendment is in the effect it will have on 
litigation liability for all people named in the auditor’s report. While the Board has examined this 
concern since the proposal’s concept release, it believes the potential risk to a named 
engagement partner would be justified by the benefits to investors of increased transparency. The 
main source of potential liability is Section 11 of the Securities Act. Section 11 of the Securities 
Act creates liability for material misstatements or omissions in the auditor’s report, after giving 
consent to the inclusion of their names in the report (PCAOB 2013b). This would not change the 
performance obligations of the signed engagement partners, or any other participating auditor. 
The issuing firm would still file consent and be subject to the same liability as the engagement 
partner (PCAOB 2013b). The engagement partner could simply be added to the consent that the 
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firm already provides, which would keep any additional administrative costs low. Litigation-
related costs could be more significant than administrative costs, but not cause for concern. 
Naming the engagement partner within the audit report would only increase the number of 
defendants in a particular lawsuit, but would not necessarily increase the number of lawsuits 
filed (PCAOB 2013b). Although accounting firms and other participants may charge higher fees 
in response to a consent requirement, the Board believes the added information to the investor is 
valuable enough to justify the potential risks to the named auditors (PCAOB 2013b ). Currently, 
the open comment period for this proposal is closed as of March 17
th
, 2014, and the staff is 
analyzing the comments received (PCAOB 2014). 
 
 
IV. PCAOB Release No. 2013-005: Proposed Auditing Standards on the Auditor's Report 
and the Auditor's Responsibilities Regarding Other Information 
 
 In an effort to increase the informational value of the auditor’s report to its users, the 
PCAOB has created such a proposal that aims to increase the report’s value through providing 
more information about the particular audit. During a financial statement audit, auditors gather 
information concerning the company, its environment, and the preparation of the financial 
statements. Investors have expressed that they would benefit from this type of information, 
because much of it they do not already have access to. Auditors have much more insight into the 
companies that they audit, which leaves investors and users of the reports wishing the audit 
reports were more relevant to the specific audit. 
 The current audit report has not changed significantly since the early 1940s. The current 
reporting model struggles at best to address the increase in global business operations. Through 
outreach activities, the PCAOB has determined that the auditor’s report has little, if any, 
communicative value. In addition, the PCAOB is facing external international pressures to 
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change its audit report structure (PCAOB 2013a). Several international standard setters, 
including the IAASB, have been making similar attempts to change their auditor reports. 
 The Board’s proposed standard would keep the current pass/fail model, as well as the 
basic elements of the current auditor’s report. The auditor would be required, however, to 
communicate critical audit matters (CAMs) within the auditor’s report that would be specific to 
each audit (PCAOB 2013a). CAMs include issues during that audit that involved the most 
difficult or complex auditor judgments, or were the most difficult in gathering an appropriate 
amount of audit evidence. If this information is made available to investors and financial 
statement users, it could bridge the gap of information asymmetry that exists between company 
management and the investors. Under this proposed standard, the critical audit matters would be 
described in the auditor’s report as such (PCAOB 2013a): 
 Identifying the critical audit matter, 
 Describing the factors that led to the decision that the matter was a critical audit matter; 
and 
 Using related accounts and disclosures to support the CAM if necessary 
 
 This information on CAMs could allow the investor to take a closer look at the parts of 
the financial statements the auditor found to be challenging. Management usually knows the 
challenging areas of the audit due to their regular communications with the auditors during the 
audit. The investors do not get to communicate to the auditors before, during, or after the audit, 
and therefore do not have the same access to the same information. This proposal aims to 
alleviate this issue through the inclusion of CAMs in the body of the auditor’s report. 
 Christensen et al. (2014) analyzed how investors react to a CAM paragraph centered on 
the audit of fair value estimates, compared to how investors react to fair value footnote 
disclosures. The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and the International 
12 | P a g e  
 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB) have required fair value footnote disclosures to help 
investor understanding of its inherent uncertainty (Christensen et al. 2014). It is argued that a 
CAM paragraph draws more attention, takes less effort to process, and has higher source 
credibility than footnote disclosures. The results are consistent with the auditors’ expectation. 
 Sirois et al. (2013) used eye-tracking technology in an experiment to examine how the 
inclusion of CAMs affects the way users read the report and integrate the information in the 
related financial statements. Using post-graduate accounting students, participants were given 
one of four different audit reports, and an evaluation was conducted of each participant’s 
behavior. Research suggests that users of audit reports are often faced with cognitive overload, 
where a task demands too much from their cognitive resources (Mayer and Moreno 2003). 
Results of the experiment show the disclosure of CAMs within the audit report significantly 
affects users’ information acquisition (Sirois et al. 2013). Participants paid closer attention to 
items that were disclosed within a CAM paragraph, and were able to more quickly access the 
related disclosure in the financial statements (Sirois et al. 2013). 
Although the disclosure of CAMs may improve users’ ability to process key information 
within the financial statements, other research suggests it may affect jurors’ assessments of 
auditor liability. A study conducted by Goodson et al. (2014) examines the standards by which 
jurors assess auditor negligence when a CAM paragraph is present in the audit report. The study 
uses undergraduate students in a mock trial alleging auditor negligence, and an audit report that 
was manipulated on the basis of an emphasis paragraph and clarifying language (Goodson et al. 
2014). Results show the following evidence regarding perceived auditor negligence (Goodson et 
al. 2014): 
 Jurors are less likely to view auditors as negligent when the term reasonable assurance is 
clarified within the audit report, 
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 Jurors are more likely to view auditors as negligent when a CAM is identified, specific 
audit procedures to address the matter are described, but there is no clarifying language; 
and 
 Jurors negligence assessments are not affected by clarifying language when a CAM is 
disclosed with no audit procedures to address the matter 
 
 The evidence from this study provides unique insight into the affect this audit reporting 
change could have for auditor’s litigation exposure. Changes to litigation risk could have 
negative consequences for audit quality and audit fees (Goodson et al. 2014). 
 The “other information” standard in this proposal focuses on information contained in the 
documents that include audited financial statements, but not the information in the financial 
statements themselves. This would force the auditor to focus more attention on potential material 
misstatements between the other information and the company’s audited financial statements. 
The auditor would be able to identify such inconsistencies that may be much more difficult for 
investors and other financial statement users to find otherwise. These mistakes occur due to a 
number of reasons, ranging from unintentional error to malicious misreporting. Ensuring the 
consistency between the audited financial statements and the other information within the same 
documents would increase the amount of quality information available to users.  
 The public comment period for this proposal closed on December 11
th
, 2013. The Board 
held a public meeting on April 2-3, 2014 the proposal and comments received. The Board 
decided to reopen the comment period until May 2
nd
, 2014 to give commenters the opportunity to 
offer additional views (PCAOB 2014). 
 
V. Research Methods 
 
 Every PCAOB concept release and proposed set of amendments comes with the 
opportunity for public comment. Any member of the public is allowed to submit a letter to the 
14 | P a g e  
 
PCAOB, which is then posted in order of submission under the related docket number. The 
majority of submissions come from current and retired CPAs, public accounting firms, 
multinational corporations/organizations, and various CPA society groups. The public comments 
allow the PCAOB to gain additional insight and knowledge on an issue they are proposing to 
solve. This, along with months of discussion, may lead the PCAOB to draft up a new proposal or 
approve the current release. Once the proposal has been adopted by the PCAOB, it must be filed 
and approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to become effective (PCAOB, 
2014c).  
 In an effort to capture the public’s views on the two proposals of interest, a common 
method of content analysis was conducted to provide data on the persons and organizations 
commenting, whether or not they support the proposal, and the reasoning behind their arguments. 
For each proposal, dozens of comment letters were downloaded, read, and analyzed. Due to time 
and data constraints, a haphazard sample was used for this paper. For Release No. 2013-009, 43 
comment letters were available at the time of this analysis, and all were used. Release No. 2013-
005 received over 200 comment letters, but only 51 were analyzed to capture a sample of the 
whole. The following information was extracted from each (which is included in Appendix 1): 
 Author of comment letter 
 Author’s Company/Organization (if applicable) 
 Support of the proposal (Y/N) 
 Summary of reason(s) behind argument 
Between the two proposals, a total of 94 comment letters were read and analyzed.  
VI. Results 
 
 The results of the comment letter analysis serve as only a sample of the whole. Although 
not all of the letters available were analyzed and accounted for, a series of trends made it 
possible to make certain conclusions from the data. For PCAOB Release No. 2013-009, 58.1 
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percent of respondents were not in favor of the disclosure of the engagement partner and other 
audit participants (Table 1). Of those in favor, 15 were from independent organizations and 
stakeholders, six audit firms, three university professors, and one preparer (Table 2). Those 
respondents that were not in favor of the proposal cited two primary arguments. 
 First, the disclosure of the engagement partner’s name and signature would not improve 
audit quality, and is not meaningful information overall. Engagement partners already work to 
produce accurate and complete reports for their clients. Adding their signature to the bottom of 
the report will not give investors and financial statement users any additional information of 
value. The specific disclosure of the engagement partner places too much emphasis on the role of 
one individual. Although the partner is responsible for the outcome of the audit report, the work 
leading up to the end product is conducted by a team of many members. This may create 
confusion for users of the audit report (Table 3).  
 Second, the disclosure of the engagement partner could increase unnecessary liability for 
that individual. Aside from litigation liability, auditor’s professional reputations are at risk of 
being attacked. Through the next decade, data will be accumulating about each engagement 
partner. Any blemish in their records may affect their ability to attract new clients. On the other 
hand, auditor’s names are generally disclosed to the public in the case of audit failure. So if the 
audit fails, it would not have mattered if the audit partner was required to sign their name on the 
report to begin with (Table 3). 
 Of the 41.9 percent of respondents that were in favor of this mandatory disclosure policy, 
their primary arguments were mirror opposites from that not in favor. Respondents believed that 
requiring the signing of the audit partner’s name in the audit report would improve audit quality, 
transparency, and accountability (Table 3). Although an auditor’s name would be disclosed in 
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the event of an audit failure, the protection of their reputation is ultimately on the line. Recent 
studies support the notion that a personal signature increases honesty and integrity (Davidson 
and Stevens 2010), and can lead to increased moral reasoning and lower misreporting of private 
information (Blay et al. 2012). 
 It is important to also consider the opinions of the “Big Four” audit firms. These four 
firms audited more than 98.0 percent of the global market capitalization of U.S. issuer 
companies, or approximately $25.9 trillion, based on year-end 2012 data (Accountability: 
Protecting Investors, the Public Interest and Prosperity). These firms’ opinions are highly 
influential because they are regarded as the public’s thought leaders in auditing. The “Big Four” 
audit firms were all not in favor of this proposal, except for Deloitte & Touche, LLP (Table 4). 
Deloitte & Touche supports the disclosure of the engagement partner’s signature, but not in the 
audit report (Deloitte & Touche Comment Letter #27, 2013). The firm believes a more feasible 
approach would be to create a database containing all of the required information in this 
proposal, which could be accessed by the public. Under this approach, it is believed that 
investors will have a single database to locate pertinent information about an audit firm or 
individual engagement partner (Deloitte & Touche Comment Letter #27, 2013). The other Big 
Four firms (EY, PricewaterhouseCoopers, and KPMG) all believe the current proposal would 
result in logistical challenges, litigation risk, and increased audit time and fees.  
 For Release No. 2013-005, 68.6 percent of the respondents were not in favor of the 
proposal to include CAMs and other information into the body of the audit report (Table 5). This 
includes 5 audit firms, 2 university professors, 26 independent organizations, and 2 stakeholders 
(Table 6). The two main arguments from those not in favor are that it would create confusion for 
investors and financial statement users, and it would increase audit costs and time constraints 
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(Table 7). Discussing accounting or internal control matters that did not require disclosure under 
U.S. GAAP or affect the auditor’s final opinion may create this confusion for investors. Such 
disclosure may also weaken investor confidence in the auditor’s opinion on the financial 
statements and the effectiveness of internal controls. Also, determining what matters are 
“critical” involves a significant amount of subjectivity, which may result in many additional 
disclosures. These additional disclosures require substantial additional work for the auditors and 
company employees, which could increase costs and time constraints. These arguments were 
resonated at the recent PCAOB Public Meeting on April 2-3, 2014 regarding CAMs and other 
information in the audit report. Kevin B. Reilly, Americas Vice Chair, Professional Practice and 
Risk Management at Ernst & Young believes that the current impact on reporting is unnecessary. 
Reilly believes the specific reporting examples in the proposing release are too lengthy. Reilly, 
speaking on behalf of Ernst & Young, LLP, supports the disclosure of CAMs and other 
information, but in a format that is much more concise while still completing the objectives of 
the proposal (PCAOB 2014d). The other three major accounting firms also support the proposal 
to disclose CAMs within the audit report, and offer similar constructive suggestions (Table 8). 
The primary concern moving forward is clearly interpreting what should be considered a critical 
audit matter, and how it should be disclosed in the report in a clear and concise manner. 
VII. Conclusion  
In an effort to improve the transparency and informational value of the auditor’s report, 
the PCAOB has issued two proposals to accomplish these objectives. The first proposal, release 
no. 2013-009, would require the personal signature of the engagement partner on the audit 
report. Other participants during the audit would also have to be disclosed, including the degree 
of participation (PCAOB 2013b). Results show that the public commenters are generally not in 
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favor of this proposal. It is argued that this proposal will not improve audit quality, and may 
increase individual liability to the audit partner. The comment period for this proposal is closed, 
and information is currently being gathered from the letters before any next step is taken 
(PCAOB 2014a). Further research should be conducted to evaluate the audit partner’s signature 
effect on audit quality. 
The second proposal, release no. 2013-005, would require the disclosure of critical audit 
matters and other information specific to each audit. This information would be included in the 
audit report as its own distinct paragraph (PCAOB 2013a). Results from public comment show 
that respondents are not in favor of this proposal. It is argued that this disclosure requirement 
would create confusion for users of the report, would be costly to implement, and would not 
provide any meaningful information to investors. The comment period for this proposal is now 
closed. The Board is reviewing information from the comment letters as well as from the public 
meeting before any next step is taken. The Board should continue discussions to create a flexible 
definition of a CAM, and take steps to consolidate the reporting requirement to decrease this 
proposal’s impact on audit work, time, and fees.  




Release No. 2013-009 
  # of Respondents % of Respondents 
In Support 18 41.9% 
Not in Support 25 58.1% 
Total 43 100.0% 
 
Table 2:  
Type In Favor Not in Favor 
Audit Firm 1 6 
Academic 1 3 
Peparer 3 1 
Independent Organization 7 10 
Stakeholder 6 5 
Total 18 25 
 
Table 3: 
Comment Letter Responses 
In Favor Not in Favor 
Will improve audit 
quality (4) 





Risk to those named on 
the audit (8) 
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Table 4: 
Firm Support Reason(s) 
Deloitte & Touche LLP Y 
Supports disclosure of engagement 
partner, but not in the auditor's report; 
increased liability under Section 11 of 
the Securities Act 
EY LLP N 
Will result in operational challenges 
that will increase the cost, complexity, 
and time required for a company to 
access the capital markets 
KPMG LLP N 
Litigation risks & logistical challenges 
from the need to obtain a consent 
PwC LLP N 
May not provide meaningful 
information to the users, also potential 
litigation risk 
 










Audit Firm 5 5 
Academic 0 2 
Peparer 1 0 
Independent Organization 9 26 
Stakeholder 1 2 
Total 16 35 
 
Release No. 2013-005 
  # of Respondents % of Respondents 
In Support  16 31.4% 
Not in Support 35 68.6% 
Total 51 100.0% 
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Table 7: 
Comment Letter Responses 
In Favor Not in Favor 
Will enhance 
informational value to 
users (16) 
May create confusion 
for users (11) 
Will enhance auditor 
communications (16) 
Costly to implement (9) 
 
Table 8: 
Firm Support Reason(s) 
Deloitte & Touche LLP Y 
See constructive 
suggestions (Docket 
No. 34, Comment 
Letters 132, 143, 
179, 228) 
EY LLP Y 
KPMG LLP Y 
PwC LLP Y 
  
















Palmeri, CPA  
P 12/4/2013 Y 
Partner already 




















IO 12/6/2013 Y 








S 12/27/2013 N 
Would make it 
easier for the 
audit partner to 





J.M. Tull School of 
Accounting, The 
Univ. of Georgia 

































National Assoc. of 
State Boards of 
Accountancy 
IO 1/24/2014 Y 
 






























places too much 
emphasis on the 
role of one 
individual 
 









































S 1/31/2014 Y 



























Florida Institute of 
Certified Public 
Accountants 
IO 2/3/2014 N 
investors would 
not have all the 














































US Senate Committee 
on Homeland Security 
and Gov't Affairs 
IO 2/3/2014 Y 
 
Nick O. 
Sagona, Jr.  
S 2/3/2014 N 
Risk to those 








Texas Society of 
CPAs 







Center for Audit 
Quality 
IO 2/3/2014 N 




































McCombs School of 
Business, The Univ. of 






























Deloitte & Touche 
LLP 








include # years 
experience 
 

















IO 1/31/2014 Y 
engagement 
partner plays a 
critical role in 
ensuring the 
overall quality 
of the audit 

















NY State Society of 
CPAs 
IO 2/4/2014 N 
this info would 







PwC LLP AF 2/4/2014 N 
may not provide 
meaningful 
information to 







































will be of little 









Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in 















it, and it will do 
no harm 
 









S 2/1/2014 Y 
engagement 
partner used to 
sign his/her 






























National Assoc. of 
Corporate Directors 







EY LLP AF 2/12/2014 N 
 
 
Grant Thornton LLP AF 2/3/2014 N 
 
 
Crowe Horwath LLP AF 2/12/2014 N 
not sufficient 
objective data 








KPMG LLP AF 3/13/2014 N litigation risks 
 
Respondent Type: Legend 
AF Audit Firm 
A Academic 
P Preparer 




























P 9/2/2013 Y 









IO 9/25/2013 N 
potential to create 
misunderstanding by 
the investors, blur 
the roles between 
auditors, 
management, and 
the audit committee, 
costly to implement 
Arthur J. 
Radin 
Radin, Glass & Co., 
LLP 
AF 10/7/2013 N 
would add no 













make it more 
difficult for readers 






Univ. of Alberta, 



































These proposals will 
not solve any 
existing problem 























































would increase audit 
time, and would not 











understanding of the 
audit process and its 















will increase the 

















results in a perceived 
difference in audit 
quality when none 
should exist 











































users and can inhibit 
understanding and 








Wells Fargo & 
Company 
IO 12/2/2013 N 
may be construed as 
creating a perception 














BP p.I.c. IO 12/3/2013 N 
may duplicate 
information 







































U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce, Center 
for Capital Markets 
Competitiveness 
IO 12/9/2013 N 
does not address 
investor needs by 






































could result in a 
perceived difference 
in audit quality 








Federation of Labor 
and Congress of 
Industrial 
Organizations 
IO 12/9/2013 N 
must be further 
strengthened to 
provide investors 
with useful new 
information 
 



















IO 12/9/2013 N takes too much time 
Loretts V. 
Cangialosi 




will not result in 
improved quality of 
the audit and may 





















































































confusion for readers 



















































inclusion of CAMs 
may create incorrect 
perception that there 
are varying degrees 
of an unqualified 
report 
 








alter the roles of 
management and the 
auditor 
 
Capital Group IO 12/9/2013 N 
users may 
misinterpret multiple 























will not enhance the 
auditor's reporting 
model, and will 
increase the cost and 
scope of the audit 



























may blur the lines of 
responsibility 
between 













could be confusing 
to investors and 
other FS users/ 
would result in an 
























































CAMs will not 
address the issues in 
the PCAOB proposal 





























will not provide 
meaningful 
information, will be 





























with little or no 
relevance to the 
mission of the 
PCAOB 
 































would not provide 
material benefits but 
may cause confusion 
to investors, increase 
costs 
 









































FDIC IO 2/6/2014 Y 
will provide useful 
information 
 
Respondent Type: Legend 
AF Audit Firm 
A Academic 
P Preparer 
IO Independent Organization 
S Stakeholder 
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